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Strategic Minerals: A Resource Crisis reports the papers and panel 
discussions of a conference held under the auspices of the Council 
on Economics and National Security (CENS), a project of the Na-
tional Strategy Information Center, on 22 May 1981.The major 
participants, for whom short biographies are included, represented 
a variety of political, strategic and commercial interests. Further-
more they adopted a range of approaches to the presentation of 
the problems, and, consequently, a particular strength of the book 
is the wide spectrum of thought focused on the central issue of 
strategic minerals. 
The book begins with three short pieces, a forward by Confer-
ence Coordinator Daniel James, the welcoming address by Arthur 
D. Taylor and the opening address by Louis W. Cabot, sketching 
in and outlining the overall crisis in strategic minerals. The remarks 
concentrate on the United States, its viewpoint and its specific 
difficulties, two threads which run through the whole book. The 
key problems are the constraints affecting home production and 
the dependence upon foreign sources, acknowledged as early as 
1952 and reiterated by Mr. Cabot: 
The overall objective of a national materials policy for the 
United States should be to insure an adequate and dependable 
flow of materials at the lowest cost consistent with national 
security and with the welfare of friendly nations.1 
The major portion of the book is divided into five sections 
covering the following topics: (a) defining the resource of war, (b) 
the role of business, (c) national security, (d) a national minerals 
policy and (e) the law of the sea. Each section includes a variety of 
contributions and therefore requires separate appraisal. 
What is the Resource War? 
The opening paper by Rear Admiral W. C. Mott (Executive 
Director, Council on Economics and National Security), based on a 
series of slides which are reproduced in the book, sets the tone with 
a wide-ranging, if somewhat idiosyncratic and uncritical, view. Brief 
mention is made of the Soviet threat to oil supplies from the Middle 
East; key "choke" points are identified. One such point coming in 
for special mention is the island of Socotra (South Yemen) which 
Admiral Mott classifies, with no presented evidence, as a "big Soviet 
base."2 It is doubtful whether any major improvements have been 
effected there as yet and, with facilities available at Aden, the island 
must be considered more in the light of a long term investment 
should there be a political reorientation in South Yemen.3 
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Using US import dependence as the criterion, the four most 
vulnerable strategic minerals are identified as cobalt, chromium, 
manganese and the platinum group metals. The contrasting de-
pendency of the West and the USSR is highlighted, but the different 
problems of supply, now and in the future, for each of the four 
minerals are not mentioned. The vital role of South Africa is 
stressed as both a source and a transporter, through its rail network, 
of strategics. However, as in several other recent publications, the 
number of ships, which Mott places at 26,000 per year, using the 
Cape Route is exaggerated.4 The latest figures produced by the 
South African Navy show that 6,500 vessels sailed the route last 
year.5 In contrast, the importance of Richards Bay north-east of 
Port Elizabeth, illustrated but not gifted with a reference in the text, 
needs further mention. It is a major port development and is by 
far the main chrome exporting point.6 In the near future it will be 
the only chrome shipment port and, consequently, its proximity to 
the Mozambique border (approximately 80 km) must give cause for 
concern. Finally, while the slides are generally very good, Mott's 
case is not helped by the obvious discrepancies in the lists of key 
US suppliers, particularly of manganese. The relative importance 
of South Africa as a source of this mineral is a significant and 
contentious issue. 
In broad terms, nonetheless, the paper provides a useful intro-
duction to the subject and strikes the right note of urgency, con-
cluding with a list of the major problems to be faced. 
After a rather pedantic, and somewhat unnecessary comment 
on the definition of resource wars, Dr. D. I. Fine (Mining and 
Minerals Resources Research Institute, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology), provides an excellent and tightly structured summary 
of problems with strategic minerals. He identifies as areas of con-
cern: (a) pre-emptive resource contracts, (b) ownership of resources, 
(c) transation strategies, (d) delivery system security and (e) security 
at harbours and loading facilities. Toward the end of his remarks, 
he speculates about possible targeting of South African chromium 
when being off-loaded at Maputo (Mozambique), but it is intended 
that the Maputo facility will be closed in any case and there is ample 
room at Richards Bay to handle all exports.7 
During his closing observations, Dr. Fine also indicates that with 
rising energy costs beneficiation (the reduction of raw ore into 
metals) is increasingly expensive, and producers with energy avail-
able will be at a great advantage. Any moves towards beneficiation 
at source would enhance the position of South Africa as a supplier 
of, for instance, ferro-chrome and ferro-manganese. 
The Role of Business in the Resource War 
The importance of a strong and buoyant industrial base in the 
US is stressed throughout the discussion regarding the function of 
business in a resource war. Panelist Dr. S. D. Strauss (Chairman, 
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Minerals Availability Committee, American Mining Congress), re-
calls the distinction, originally and usefully applied in World War 
II, between the terms strategic (import dependent) and critical 
(concerned with defence), although he notes that many minerals 
quickly became best defined by both terms. A further term might 
now be employed to indicate limited world resources of certain 
materials. Of vital significance to US planning is the current lack 
of domestic production of manganese chromium, cobalt, and plati-
num group metals. However, there is a chance to reduce import 
dependency by developing potentially viable sources of cobalt and 
platinum although this type of mining is only likely with a guaran-
teed floor price. On the other hand, while there are large US 
resources of" manganese and chromium, the quality is poor and, 
thus, insufficient for domestic purposes. As a consequence, Dr. 
Strauss feels the need for both a workable and consistent stockpile 
policy,8 as well as a planned development of possible US sources. 
This paper provides an amplification of certain points left undevel-
oped by Mott. 
Several of these issues are taken up by Dr. A. L. Bernent (Vice 
President, Technical Resources, TRW Inc.), who confirms, short of 
major seabed mining, the continuing US reliance upon imports of 
these minerals. Therefore, as he indicates, prices are critical and 
are likely to be affected by such factors as temporary supply dis-
ruptions, conflicts and large scale geopolitical changes.9 In devel-
oping this theme, Dr. Bernent touches on several key topics such as 
the defence of offshore facilities and the lead times attendant in 
using semi-processed material from a stockpile. It is concluded that 
the levers of power are with the suppliers, and this must be appre-
ciated by business and industry.10 There then follows a very detailed 
and elegantly constructed check list for business under the headings: 
planning, procurement and technology. For example, Dr. Bernent 
points out, to ensure procurement, a mineral must to be traced 
back along its trade route to the mine from which it originated so 
that vulnerable locations can be identified. While, recently, articles 
on sea lanes have proliferated, discussions regarding land corridors 
have been very limited.11 Dr. Bernent's other suggestions are equally 
insightful and intriguing. 
The concluding work in the section, by Dr. W. O. Baker 
(former Chairman of the Board, Bell Laboratories), investigates 
scientific developments which could result in other minerals being 
designated strategic. However, with the sole possible exception of 
palladium (a platinum group metal), nothing mentioned would 
appear to involve any great difficulties even with reasonable future 
projections. 
Discussion revolves around three main problem areas: (a) con-
version capacity, (b) market cycles and (c) potential displacement 
from non-essential uses. 
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The Resource War and National Security 
This section relates, with little actual reference to strategic 
minerals, the general US security position in the light of Soviet 
advances, Third World nationalism and the threat of cartels. Dr. 
W. R. Van Cleave (Director, Defense & Strategic Studies Program, 
University of Southern California) shows that the present military 
imbalance represents the fruition of Soviet modernization pro-
grammes. It follows, therefore, that towards the end of the decade, 
obsolescence, particularly in the US fleet, will become a major 
problem. As it is reasonable to assume that this is foreseen by the 
Soviets, the immediate future might well be an unstable period. 
At present, as Dr. Van Cleave indicates, economic problems in 
the USSR tend to be offset by military activity made possible by the 
capacity for force projection. There is a useful section of the 'cor-
relation of forces,' providing a vital reminder to the West that, while 
maintaining a nuclear answer, adequate general forces should not 
be neglected. This was recently illustrated most dramatically by the 
problems of the British task force in the Falkland Islands. 
In his contribution, Dr. A. J. Cottrell (Executive Director, Mar-
itime Studies, Cente r for Strategic and Internat ional Studies, 
Georgetown University) concentrates on the Middle East and the 
Indian Ocean. Such vital strategic topics as the Rapid Deployment 
Force, Diego Garcia and the sale of AWACs to Saudi Arabia are 
discussed. 
Admiral M. Johnson (Former CINC South, NATO) relates the 
history of relevant treaties, particularly those stemming from UN 
Article 51, and bemoans in detail the area limitations of NATO.12 
He concludes that a new Oceanic Alliance based on Article 51 is 
vital.13 
A series of brief comments and questions underlines the crucial 
point that, while the US can offer diplomatic and economic ties, the 
Soviet Union is virtually limited to military aid. This is clearly seen 
in many parts of Africa. 
Generally this is a rather limited section with few new ideas 
and little attempt to link the papers directly to considerations of 
strategic minerals. More concentration on key sealanes like the Cape 
Route might have been more appropriate. 
Towards a National Minerals Policy 
Hon. H. H. Schmitt (Chairman, Subcommittee on Science, 
Technology and Space, United States Senate), the keynote speaker 
and a man with an unique viewpoint, provides in an interesting and 
discursive paper—a sound commentary on Congressional interest in 
strategic minerals. While acknowledging the complexity of the prob-
lem he considers a national strategic minerals policy to be vital. This 
section, although of a general nature, is useful in placing the debate 
in its domestic political context. 
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Is the Law of the Sea Treaty Viable? 
With the Administration's decision on renegotiation, the law of 
the sea has become a hotly debated political and strategic topic. 
Discussion ranges from the rights of ship passage to the problems 
of landlocked states. However, the issue of seabed mining and, 
associated with it, production control necessary to ensure the via-
bility of Third World land based production, is of particular signif-
icance. 
The three participants in the final panel furnish, among them, 
evidence for both sides in the debate regarding the relative impor-
tance of the two key issues: (a) access to seabed minerals and (b) 
freedom of navigation. 
Dr. J. N. Moore (Director, Center for Oceans Law and Policy, 
University of Virginia) traces the history of the UNCLOS III ne-
gotiations and sees them as part of the world-wide struggle for law 
and power. As such they are very relevant to the North/South 
debate. He sets out both sides of the argument. R. A. Legatski 
(Counsel, Ocean Industries Association) illustrates the case for the 
importance of access to minerals by citing the problems, technology 
transfer, patents, economic competition and defence sensitivity, in-
dustrial interests might otherwise have to face. B. H. Brittin (Mem-
ber of Board, Citizens for Ocean Law), on the other hand, considers 
freedom of navigation to be more the important issue since short-
ages can be offset by stockpiles, and seabed mining is, in times of 
hostility, extremely vulnerable. 
This section is clearly of great significance for future develop-
ments in the field of strategic mineral exploitation. The discussion 
makes lively and compelling reading, providing a succinct summary 
of the major points frequently under examination. 
For the layman, the book provides a first class background to 
most of the major facets of the resource war. For the expert, the 
treatment is somewhat uneven although the breadth of coverage 
alone makes this a worthwhile volume. The papers by Fine and 
Bernent together with the UNCLOS III debate are particularly 
valuable. 
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